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Abstract 
Subjective mental effort rating scales are widely used in research on learning, instruction, and 
training. However, the timing and frequency of application of those rating scales differs between 
studies. Some apply a rating scale repeatedly after every task in a learning or test phase, others only 
once at the end of a phase. Four experiments are presented that investigated how timing and 
frequency of mental effort measurements affect the results obtained. The findings from Experiment 
1 (between-subjects) and 2 (within-subjects), using different arrangements of simple and complex 
tasks, showed that a single rating after a series of tasks resulted in a higher mental effort score than 
the average of ratings provided immediately after every task. A similar result was obtained in 
Experiment 3 with series of complex tasks, but not with simple tasks. Experiment 4 showed that 
knowing beforehand that mental effort rating will be required after completing all tasks results in 
lower scores, but average retrospective ratings per task still differed from a single retrospective 
rating. Taken together, these experiments suggest that timing and frequency of effort ratings do 
affect the results obtained and that repeatedly measuring mental effort after each task in the series 
seems to be preferable.  
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Timing and Frequency of Mental Effort Measurement: Evidence in Favor of Repeated Measures  
In research on learning, instruction, and training, subjective measures of mental or cognitive 
effort (Paas, 1992; Yeo & Neal, 2008) are regularly applied. Such measurements can reveal 
important additional information for researchers that is not necessarily reflected by more common 
performance measures such as accuracy, speed, or number/type of errors made. Particularly, the 
combination of performance and mental effort measures can provide information concerning the 
relative efficiency of training methods, in terms of the knowledge or skill acquisition process and 
the quality of knowledge or skills acquired (see e.g., Hoffman, & Schraw, 2010; Paas & Van 
Merriënboer, 1993; Van Gog & Paas, 2008), as well as motivational factors in training (see e.g., 
Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989; Paas, Tuovinen, Van Merriënboer, & Darabi, 2005; Yeo & Neal, 
2004).  
Different subjective mental effort rating scales are available. For example, the 
multidimensional NASA-Task Load Index (NASA-TLX; Hart & Staveland, 1988) incorporates 
measures of perceived performance, effort, frustration, and mental, physical and temporal task 
demands. In a modified form (to make it suitable for cognitive tasks) NASA-TLX has also been 
used in educational research (e.g., Gerjets, Scheiter, & Catrambone, 2006; Kester, Lehnen, Van 
Gerven, & P. A. Kirschner, 2006; Scheiter, Gerjets, Vollmann, & Catrambone, 2009). Yeo and 
Neal (2004, 2008) applied an 11-point single item rating scale asking participants to rate how hard 
they were trying, ranging from (0) not at all, to (10) extremely hard. Paas (1992) developed a uni-
dimensional 9-point symmetrical rating scale which asks participants to rate how much mental 
effort they invested in a task, ranging from (1) very very low mental effort, to (9) very, very high 
mental effort. Mental effort has been defined by Paas and colleagues as “the cognitive capacity that 
is actually allocated to accommodate the demands imposed by the task; thus, it can be considered to 
reflect the actual cognitive load” (Paas, Tuovinen, Tabbers, & Van Gerven, 2003, p. 64). This 
measure or a slightly adapted version thereof has been applied in many educational psychology 
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studies (see Paas et al., 2003; Van Gog & Paas, 2008), particularly those inspired by cognitive load 
theory (Sweller, Ayres & Kalyuga, 2011; Sweller, Van Merriënboer, & Paas, 1998).  
Although single-item scales have been criticized, Yeo and Neal (2008) discuss research that 
shows that for unambiguous constructs such as perceived mental effort or perceived task difficulty, 
single-item measures have psychometric properties equalling those of multi-item measures. 
Moreover, Paas’s 9-point mental effort rating scale has been shown to be sensitive enough to detect 
small variations in task complexity (see Paas, Van Merriënboer, & Adam, 1994; Van Gerven, Paas, 
Van Merriënboer, & Schmidt, 2004).  
An important question, however, is when to apply such subjective rating scales, as 
researchers tend to apply them either multiple times during or once after the learning or test phase. 
The first type of studies asks participants to provide a rating immediately after every task in a 
learning or test phase (e.g., single-item scale: Kirschner, Paas, & Kirschner, 2009; Kirschner, Paas, 
Kirschner, & Janssen, 2011; Nievelstein, Van Gog, Van Dijck, & Boshuizen, 2011; Paas, 1992; 
Paas, & Van Merriënboer, 1994; Spanjers, Wouters, Van Gog, & Van Merriënboer, 2011; Van 
Gog, Kester, & Paas, 2011; Van Gog, Paas, & Van Merriënboer, 2006, 2008; Van Merriënboer et 
al., 2002; Wouters, Paas, & Van Merriënboer, 2009). This type of measurement requires learners to 
retrospect only on the task they just finished that is probably still (partly) activated in working 
memory. The second type of studies asks learners only once at the end of an entire learning or test 
phase to provide an overall rating (e.g., single-item scale: De Koning, Tabbers, Rikers, & Paas, 
2010; NASA-TLX: Gerjets et al., 2006; Kester et al., 2006; Scheiter et al., 2009; multiple self-
constructed items: Huk & Ludwigs, 2009). This type of measurement requires learners to provide a 
retrospective judgment of the cognitive load imposed by a whole sequence of (sub)tasks, which 
probably needs to be retrieved from long-term memory. Whereas this single retrospective rating is 
used as an indicator of the cognitive load experienced during the learning phase or test phase, with 
multiple ratings the experienced cognitive load is obtained by calculating the average of the ratings.  
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Given these differences in the timing and frequency with which rating scales are applied, 
there are likely to be differences in the results obtained, and as a consequence, in the conclusions 
that are drawn. A series of four experiments is presented here, in which it is investigated how the 
timing and frequency of single-item mental effort measures (Paas scale), that is, after every task in 
a series or once at the end of a series of tasks, affect the results obtained.  
At least two theoretical reasons for favoring the measurement of mental effort immediately 
after each task over a single measurement at the end of a series of tasks can be given. First, the goal 
of studies in which effort is measured is often to compare different approaches to instruction, and 
instructional packages may contain many different types of tasks (e.g., worked examples and 
problems). When measuring effort only once at the end of the instructional phase, it is impossible 
to determine to what extent different components of the package contributed to cognitive load 
during learning. For instance, example study often requires less effort than problem solving (e.g., 
Paas, 1992; Van Gog et al., 2006), but this information would be unavailable when only a single 
rating at the end is given. Second, it is clearer what a single measurement after one task reflects 
than what a single measurement at the end of the series of tasks reflects. That is, participants can be 
expected to be able to introspect on the effort they invested in a task they just finished, that is likely 
to still be (partly) activated in working memory. However, when mental effort is measured only 
once at the end of a series of tasks, the rating will probably also involve information retrieved from 
long-term memory, and it is unclear whether participants estimate their invested mental effort as an 
average over all tasks, the last tasks they worked on (i.e., recency effect), the most complex tasks 
they worked on, or any combination of those possibilities. Experiment 1 therefore implements two 
conditions, rating after every task vs. rating once at the end of a sequence of tasks, using different 
task sequences in each condition that contain both simple problems (i.e., low in intrinsic load) and 
complex problems (i.e., high in intrinsic load). This will allow us to investigate both the differences 
(if any) between results obtained when measuring mental effort repeatedly or once at the end of a 
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sequence of tasks, and will provide insight into what a single rating at the end of a sequence might 
reflect (i.e., does it correspond to the average effort, the effort on the last tasks, or the effort on the 




Eighty-seven secondary education students volunteered to participate in this study (39 male; 
age: M = 15.60, SD = .95).  
Materials  
Problems. Six problems were used varying in intrinsic load (i.e., complexity). Three 
problems were high in intrinsic load (complex), modelled after the problem used by Sweller (1993, 
p. 6): “Suppose 5 days after the day before yesterday is Friday. What day of the week is 
tomorrow?” Three problems were low in intrinsic load (simple), for example: “Suppose yesterday 
was Tuesday. What day of the week is tomorrow?” 
Mental effort rating scale. Invested mental effort was measured using the 9-point subjective 
rating scale developed by Paas (1992), which ranges from (1) very, very low mental effort to (9) 
very, very high mental effort.  
Design and Procedure  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. In the first (‘Multiple 
Ratings’; n = 44), participants were asked to rate the mental effort they invested in solving each 
problem directly after completing it (i.e., six times). In the second (Single Rating; n = 43), 
participants were asked to rate the mental effort they invested in solving the problems after 
completing all problems (i.e., once). The order of the problems was varied within each condition, 
creating four different sequences, in order to ensure that possible effects would not be due to one 
particular sequence of tasks we used and the use of different sequences also allowed us to find out 
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whether single ratings at the end would be affected by recency effects (in which case ending with a 
simple task and especially a number of simpler tasks should lead to a lower rating than ending with 
a complex task). Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four sequences: [1] simple-
simple-simple-complex-complex-complex (SSSCCC; n = 20), [2] simple-complex-simple-
complex-simple-complex (SCSCSC; n = 23), [3] complex-simple-complex-simple-complex-simple 
(CSCSCS; n = 22), and [4] complex-complex-complex-simple-simple-simple (CCCSSS; n = 22).  
Participants were given 1 minute to find the answer to each problem, and they had to do it 
mentally, that is, they were not allowed to use paper and pen while working out the answer. 
Depending on assigned condition, they rated their perceived mental effort after each task, or after 
all six tasks on the nine-point mental effort rating scale. Each problem and each mental effort rating 
scale was printed on a separate page of A4 paper. Participants were not allowed to proceed to the 
next problem until the experiment leader signalled that the minute allotted for completing the 
problem was over.  
Results 
Performance on each problem was rated as either correct (1 point per problem) or incorrect 
(0 points). Mean performance on the three simple and the three complex tasks was calculated (i.e., 
scores were summed and divided by 3; max. mean score = 1). As one would expect, mean 
performance on the simple tasks was high (M = .93, SD = .20), whereas mean performance on the 
complex tasks was low (M = .23, SD = .21).  
The mean mental effort invested in all six problems in the Multiple Ratings condition was 
3.75 (SD = 1.06), whereas that in the Single Rating condition was 5.23 (SD = 1.40). This difference 
is significant, t(85) = -5.56, p < .001 (two-tailed), Cohen’s d = 1.19.  
An ANOVA on effort in the Single Rating condition with sequence as a factor showed no 
effect of sequence F(3, 39) = 1.56, p > .20.  
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A closer look at the data from the Multiple Ratings condition, shows that the mean mental 
effort invested in the simple problems was 2.03 (SD = .79) compared to 5.47 (SD = 1.64) in the 
complex problems. Note that the mean effort invested in the complex problems is almost equal to 
the mental effort investment indicated by Single Rating condition. A repeated measures analysis 
with mean mental effort invested in the simple and the complex problems as within subjects 
variable and sequence as between-subjects variable shows that this difference is highly significant, 
F(1, 40) = 227.50, MSE = 1.14, p < .001, ηp2 = .85. There was no interaction with sequence F(3, 
40) < 1.  
Discussion 
This experiment provided some insight into how timing and frequency of measurement 
affects mental effort ratings. When asked to rate invested mental effort only once after completing 
all problems in task sequences that contain both simple and complex problems, this rating is higher 
than the average of ratings over all six tasks. The data suggest that students may base their overall 
rating on the most complex problems they worked on. As there was no effect of sequence, this 
seems to be the case irrespective of whether participants worked on the complex problems first 
(CS) or last (SC) and irrespective of whether tasks were presented in a blocked (SSSCCC and 
CCCSSS) or alternating (SCSCSC and CSCSCS) fashion.  
Because a between-subjects design was used in this study, a possible explanation for these 
findings might be that participants in the condition that provided a single rating at the end of the 
series of tasks did not have a good recollection of the tasks or the effort they invested in each task, 
and mainly remembered the most complex tasks on which they then based their judgment.  
Experiment 2 
To investigate whether the findings from Experiment 1 can be explained by students not 
having a good memory representation of the amount of effort they invested in each problem, 
Experiment 2 uses a within-subjects design, asking participants to rate their invested mental effort 
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both immediately after each task as well as at the end of the sequence. Rating mental effort 
immediately after each task may result in better memory of the amount of effort invested in each 
task, which would be expected to affect the overall effort rating at the end of the sequence.  
Method 
Participants  
Thirty-nine secondary education students volunteered to participate in this study (29  
male; age: M = 16.00, SD = .94).  
Materials  
Tasks and mental effort rating scales were identical to those used in Experiment 1.  
Design and Procedure  
Rating was now a within-subjects variable: All participants rated their perceived mental 
effort immediately after each task, as well as after all six tasks on the nine-point mental effort rating 
scale. So, there was now only one condition, but as in Experiment 1, four different task sequences 
were used to which participants were randomly assigned: [1] SSSCCC (n = 9), [2] SCSCSC (n = 
10), [3] CSCSCS (n = 10), and [4] CCCSSS (n = 10). The procedure was the same as in 
Experiment 1. 
Results 
Performance on each problem was again rated as either correct (1 point per problem) or 
incorrect (0 points). Mean performance on the three simple and the three complex tasks was 
calculated (i.e., scores were summed and divided by 3; max. mean score = 1). As in Experiment 1, 
mean performance on the simple tasks was high (M = .94, SD = .17) and mean performance on the 
complex tasks was low (M = .27, SD = .26).  
The mean mental effort of ratings on each of the six problems was 3.99 (SD = 0.93). The 
mean effort score provided after the sequence of tasks was again higher than the average over six 
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tasks: 4.87 (SD = 1.43). A repeated measures analysis shows this difference to be significant: 
F(1,35)= 39.99, p < .001, ηp2 = .50. There was no effect of sequence.  
A closer look at the ratings after each task, shows that the mean mental effort invested in the 
simple problems was 1.92 (SD = 0.85) and in the complex problems 6.07 (SD = 1.40). Note that the 
effort rating provided at the end is not as high as the mean of ratings on the complex problems, and 
a repeated measures analysis on the mean mental effort invested in the three complex tasks and the 
overall effort rating shows this difference to be significant, F(1, 35)= 113.36, p < .001, ηp2 = .75. 
There was no effect of sequence.  
Discussion 
In line with the findings reported in Experiment 1, Experiment 2 also showed that a mental 
effort rating provided at the end of a sequence of tasks was higher than the mean of the ratings 
provided after each of the six tasks. Interestingly, however, this overall rating was not as high as the 
mean rating on the complex problems. Therefore, it is possible that rating invested mental effort 
after each task indeed led to a somewhat better memory representation, reducing the need to rely on 
the memory of the most complex tasks. Still, however, the rating at the end of the sequence was 
significantly higher than the mean of ratings after each task. A potential explanation might be that 
participants assign the complex problems more weight than the simple problems when asked to 
give a rating after the whole sequence of tasks.  
So, for task sequences that contain both simple and complex problems, the findings from 
Experiments 1 and 2 imply that researchers measuring cognitive load either after each task or after 
a sequence of tasks will come to different conclusions regarding participants’ mental effort 
investment in completing the tasks, with the single measure leading to a higher score. An 
interesting question is what would happen when the task sequence does not contain both simple and 
complex problems, but tasks of the same complexity level. If students indeed give the complex 
problems more weight when providing a mental effort rating at the end of a sequence of tasks, the 
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effect that this leads to a higher score than the average of ratings immediately after each task, 
should disappear when tasks are all simple or all complex. This question is addressed in 
Experiment 3.  
Experiment 3 
Given that tasks of the same level of complexity are used in this experiment, we expect 
there to be no difference between the average of six ratings obtained after each task and the single 
rating at the end.  
Method 
Participants  
Forty-five secondary education students volunteered to participate in this study (16  
male; age: M = 15.58, SD = 1.22).  
Materials  
Tasks and mental effort rating scales were similar to those used in Experiment 1; additional 
problems were developed to create sequences of six complex (high intrinsic load) and six simple 
(low intrinsic load) problems.  
Design and Procedure  
As in Experiment 2, a within-subjects design was used. Participants were randomly assigned 
to one of two conditions: [1] simple tasks only (n = 22), [2] complex tasks only (n = 23). All 
participants rated their perceived mental effort immediately after each task, as well as after all six 
tasks on the nine-point mental effort rating scale. The rest of the procedure was identical to 
Experiments 1 and 2.  
Results 
Performance on each problem was rated as either correct (1 point per problem) or incorrect 
(0 points). Mean performance on the tasks was calculated (i.e., scores were summed and divided by 
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6; max. mean score = 1). Performance in the simple tasks conditions was high (M = .99, SD = .04) 
and performance in the complex tasks conditions was low (M = .34, SD = .18).  
A repeated measures analysis, comparing the mean of ratings on each of the six problems to 
the rating at the end of the sequence, with task complexity as between-subjects factor, shows a 
highly significant interaction effect, F(1, 43)= 14.76, p < .001, ηp2 = .26. This interaction effect 
signifies that for the simple problems condition there is no significant difference between the mean 
of ratings on all six tasks (M = 1.25, SD = .44) and the mean rating at the end of the sequence of 
tasks (M = 1.14, SD = .35), whereas for the complex problems condition the rating at the end of the 
sequence of tasks (M = 6.00, SD = 2.09) was higher than the mean of ratings on the six tasks (M = 
5.46, SD = 2.00).  
Discussion 
This experiment showed that in line with our expectation, there was no difference between 
the mean of ratings provided immediately after each task and the rating at the end when tasks were 
all low in intrinsic load. In contrast to our expectation, however, this was not the case when tasks 
were all high in intrinsic load. On the complex (high intrinsic load) problems a similar pattern 
emerged to that found in Experiments 1 and 2, with the rating at the end being higher than the 
average of ratings provided immediately after each task.  
This suggests that the findings of Experiments 1 and 2, in which task sequences contained 
both simple and complex problems, cannot be explained by students assigning more weight to the 
complex problems when providing a mental effort rating at the end of the sequence of tasks. A 
possible explanation for these results is one that was previously raised (Experiment 2), that is, the 
memory representations (or lack thereof) of the tasks and mental effort invested in those tasks. 
Participants’ limited working memory resources have to be distributed between task performance 
and monitoring activities (cf. Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989), which is not too difficult on simple tasks, 
but when they are not aware that monitoring is required, learners will probably devote all available 
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resources to trying to find a solution on the complex tasks (see also Yeo, Loft, Xiao, & Kiewitz, 
2009). As a consequence, participants are not likely to build an adequate memory representation of 
those tasks. However, if participants would know beforehand that they will be required to rate 
mental effort afterwards, they may devote some cognitive capacity to monitoring, which should 
result in a more accurate memory representation, which should be reflected in the mental effort  
rating.  
Experiment 4 
In this experiment, participants were informed beforehand that they would have to 
retrospectively introspect on the mental effort they invested in solving the problems. Next to two 
conditions in which a single rating at the end is required (knowing or not knowing this), we also 
added conditions in which retrospective ratings have to be provided for each of the six problems 
(i.e., providing a mental effort rating per problem, after having completed all problems), knowing 
or not knowing this. The latter conditions were added to be able to investigate the effects of timing 
of ratings as well as of monitoring more thoroughly. That is, regarding timing, these conditions 
allow for investigating whether there are differences between multiple ratings and a single rating 
when all are done retrospectively. In addition, it allows detecting effects of monitoring on a more 
detailed level: when knowing a rating is required, participants should be better able to remember 
the order of the simple and complex problems, and thus more accurately rate the effort they 
invested in each problem than when not knowing this. 
It is expected that participants’ knowing that they have to retrospectively rate mental effort 
will lead to more active performance monitoring and hence, a difference in ratings between the 
conditions. Specifically, given the findings from the previous experiments, one would expect this 
difference to be that the mental effort ratings are lower in the conditions in which participants knew 
they would be asked to rate their perceived mental effort retrospectively than in the conditions in 
which they did not know this.  
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Method 
Participants  
Participants were 107 secondary education students (51 male; age: M = 16.46, SD = .82).  
Materials  
Tasks and mental effort rating scales were identical to those used in Experiments 1 and 2. 
Participants who were asked to retrospectively rate mental effort per task, were given a list saying 
task 1, task 2, task 3, et cetera. That is, no clue was given as to the content of each task. In the 
conditions in which participants were informed beforehand that they would have to rate their 
invested mental effort after completing all tasks, they were not informed whether they would have 
to do this per task or in a single rating; they were only told: “Afterwards, you will be asked to 
indicate how much mental effort you invested in solving those problems”.  
Design and Procedure  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions: [1] giving a single mental 
effort rating after completing all six problems, knowing that this would be requested (Single Rating 
–Knowing; n = 28), [2] giving a single mental effort rating after completing all six problems, not 
knowing that this would be requested (Single Rating –Not Knowing; n = 27), [3] giving a mental 
effort rating on each of the six problems after completing all six, knowing that this would be 
requested (Multiple Ratings –Knowing; n = 26), and [4] giving a mental effort rating on each of the 
six problems after completing all six, not knowing that this would be requested (Multiple Ratings; 
Not Knowing; n = 26). As in Experiments 1 and 2, four sequences of tasks were used to which 
participants in each condition were randomly assigned. All participants retrospectively rated their 
perceived mental effort (i.e., after completing all six tasks) on the nine-point mental effort rating 
scale, either providing one overall rating or a rating per task. The rest of the procedure was 
identical to that of Experiments 1, 2, and 3.  
Results 
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Performance on each problem was rated as either correct (1 point per problem) or incorrect 
(0 points). Mean performance on the three simple and the three complex tasks was calculated (i.e., 
scores were summed and divided by 3; max. mean score = 1). In line with Experiments 1, 2, and 3, 
performance on the simple tasks was high (M = .95, SD = .18) and performance on the complex 
tasks was low (M = .23, SD = .25).  
An ANOVA on the mean mental effort ratings given in the Multiple Ratings conditions 
shows a significant difference, F(1, 50) = 5.30, p < .05, ηp2 = .096. In line with our expectation, the 
mean mental effort was lower in the Knowing condition (M = 4.08, SD = 1.17) than in the Not 
Knowing condition (M = 4.78, SD = 1.01).  
An ANOVA on the mental effort ratings given in the Single Rating conditions also shows a 
significant difference, F(1, 53) = 7.03, p < .05, ηp2= .117. In line with our expectation, mental effort 
was lower in the Knowing condition (M = 4.68, SD = 1.18) than in the Not Knowing condition (M 
= 5.59, SD = 1.37).  
However, again there seems to be a large difference between providing a single rating and 
multiple ratings even when those are also provided retrospectively, with the single rating again 
seeming to be higher. An ANOVA comparing the mean of the six ratings with the single rating 
between conditions, shows that this difference is significant, F(1, 105) = 8.40, p = .005, ηp2 = .074, 
with the single rating being higher (M = 5.13, SD = 1.35) than the mean of the six ratings (M = 
4.43, SD = 1.14).  
A closer look at the mental effort rated retrospectively per task for the simple and complex 
problems, shows that the mean mental effort invested in the simple problems in the Knowing 
condition is 2.28 (SD = 1.63), but in the Not Knowing condition it was 3.67 (SD = 1.88); this 
difference is significant, F(1, 50) = 8.04, p < .01, ηp2= .139. On the complex problems, there was no 
significant difference between Knowing (M = 5.87, SD = 1.76) and Not Knowing (M = 5.88, SD = 
1.98), F(1, 50) < 1.  
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Discussion 
In line with our expectation, Experiment 4 shows that knowing that a retrospective mental 
effort rating is required, will alter (i.e., lower) those retrospective ratings. This suggests that the 
performance monitoring explanation might indeed explain the findings from Experiments 1, 2, and 
3, which found single retrospective ratings to be higher than the mean of ratings over six tasks. It 
seems that telling participants beforehand that a retrospective mental effort rating will be required, 
lowers this rating. However, this does not necessarily make it more in line with the average of 
ratings over six tasks, as a comparison (by visual inspection) with the data from Experiment 1 
shows (Experiment 2 is not considered here as it applied a within-subjects design, whereas both 
Experiment 1 and 4 used a between-subjects design and are as such more comparable). In 
Experiment 1, the mean of six ratings provided immediately after each task was 3.75, and of the 
single rating at the end was 5.23. In Experiment 4, the group that had to provide a single rating not 
knowing this, had a mean of 5.59, whereas the condition that knew a rating would be required, had 
a mean of 4.68. So although the ratings by both groups who provided a single rating not knowing 
this would be required, seem quite equal, and the rating from the group who was aware that a rating 
would be required is lower, this rating (4.68) still seems substantially higher than the average over 
six tasks (3.75).  
Interestingly, the mean of six ratings in the condition in which a retrospective rating had to 
be provided for each task and participants were aware of this (i.e., 4.08), is still somewhat higher, 
but comes much closer to the mean of six ratings provided immediately after every task (i.e., 3.75) 
than any of the other conditions. This suggests that when participants are instructed that they will 
have to provide a retrospective rating of their mental effort, they may be quite accurate in providing 
ratings per task. This again suggests that they are monitoring more actively, which is further 
supported by the analysis of the differences in complex and simple task ratings between 
participants who had to provide a retrospective mental effort rating per task, knowing or not 
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knowing that mental effort rating would be required. There was a difference in the ratings provided 
on the simple tasks, with those in the condition that knew being lower (i.e., 2.28, which does not 
deviate much from the 2.03 found in Experiment 1) than in the condition that did not know (i.e., 
3.67), which probably means that learners in the condition that knew they would be asked to rate 
mental effort remembered pretty well where the simple tasks were located in their sequence, 
whereas participants who did not know this beforehand were probably not very sure about the order 
of the tasks, and therefore gave higher ratings on the simple problems as well.  
General Discussion 
The findings from Experiment 4 highlight the important role of monitoring when rating 
retrospectively. The average of retrospectively provided ratings per task comes closest to the 
average of ratings provided immediately after each task in Experiment 1. However, even when all 
ratings are done retrospectively, a single rating resulted in a higher score than the average of six 
ratings, which suggests that monitoring cannot fully explain the difference between a single 
retrospective rating at the end of a sequence of tasks and the average of multiple ratings. Rather, 
taken together, the findings from the four experiments presented here suggest that possibly, 
participants are not considering the effort invested in every single task when providing a single 
mental effort rating at the end of a series of tasks, but instead, perceive the series as one task to be 
rated. If so, the number of tasks in the series and/or duration of the series might be a potential cause 
of the higher rating at the end, given that time also plays a role in experienced cognitive load (see 
Xie & Salvendy, 2000). Another potential cause might lie in the so-called positive-negative 
asymmetry effect, which shows that “In general, …, negative information receives more processing 
and contributes more strongly to the final impression than does positive information.” (Baumeister, 
Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; p. 323-324). If complex problems are experienced as more 
negative, they might contribute more to the overall impression than simple problems. This might 
also explain the findings from Experiment 4, that single retrospective ratings became lower when 
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participants knew such a rating was required, and that participants who provided retrospective 
ratings for each task and knew they had to do so seemed to remember better where in the sequence 
the simple tasks were located. That is, monitoring task complexity may have altered those 
participants’ impression of the task sequence, making the more complex tasks somewhat less 
dominant in the final impression. Future research should address these explanations and try to 
uncover what exactly participants base their mental effort ratings on, for example by applying 
concurrent or (cued) retrospective verbal reporting techniques to ratings of mental effort (Ericsson 
& Simon, 1993; Van Gog, Paas, Van Merriënboer, & Witte, 2005).  
Another interesting question for future research to address, is whether the same timing and 
frequency effects would apply to other subjective rating scales that are sensitive to detecting 
variations in task difficulty which are associated with cognitive load, such as perceived difficulty 
ratings, which have also been applied during tasks (e.g., Ayres, 2006), after each task (e.g., Marcus, 
Cooper, & Sweller, 1996), or after a sequence of tasks (e.g., Kalyuga, Chandler, Tuovinen, & 
Sweller, 2001; Pollock, Chandler, & Sweller, 2002). Finally, it would be interesting to investigate 
in future studies what the relationship is between multiple ratings or single ratings and learning 
outcomes, both in terms of test performance and in terms of effort investment on the test. A 
potential limitation of the present study is that we did not use learning tasks or measure learning 
outcomes (i.e., we assessed effort and direct performance, not future performance), whereas most 
studies in which mental effort is measured are conducted with the aim of comparing different 
approaches to instruction. One might argue that it is not so bad if multiple ratings and a single 
rating do not correspond, as long as both would lead to the same conclusions about differences 
between instructional conditions. However, as mentioned before, when measuring effort only once 
at the end of an instructional phase, it is impossible to determine to what extent different 
components of the instructional package contributed to cognitive load during learning. Moreover, 
depending on what the single rating is based on exactly, it is not unthinkable that subtle differences 
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between conditions would be missed when only single ratings at the end of an instructional phase 
are used.   
Until more is known about what mental effort ratings at the end of a series of tasks reflect, 
the results of the four experiments presented here seem to suggest that measuring mental effort 
after each task is preferable over a single measure at the end of a series of tasks. One might argue 
based on the findings from Experiment 4 that providing mental effort ratings retrospectively is not 
a problem as long as this is done per task, and participants are informed beforehand that such 
ratings are required. However, this may change when task sequences are longer, or when time on 
task is longer, because monitoring task content and effort investment might be more difficult on 
tasks or sequences of longer duration. It might therefore be advisable to apply a rating scale 
multiple times during a task when it is of relatively long duration (cf. first experiment of Van 
Merriënboer et al., 2002; Yeo & Neal, 2004, 2008; see also Ayres, 2006, for an application of 
perceived difficulty ratings during a task). Moreover, repeated ratings over time in a series of tasks 
or in a task of longer duration will provide information on the fluctuation in cognitive load (i.e., 
instantaneous load; Xie & Salvendy, 2000) that is lost when only a single rating at the end is 
obtained.  
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